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Query: Provide information on the Eighth Department of China’s Ministry
of National Security, including typical responsibilities of its rank
officers and its agents in Hong Kong. Do agents posted to Hong Kong
spy on pro-democracy groups? Response: SUMMARY The Eighth Department of China’s National Security Ministry is
either an international relations think tank or a counterespionage
unit, depending on the source contacted. By any account, the
ministry, known more commonly as the Ministry for State Security, has
units whose agents spy on political bodies, businessmen, and others
in Hong Kong and on pro-democracy groups outside of China. BACKGROUND A prominent Chinese-born dissident now living in the United States
who is also Executive Director of the Washington DC-based Laogai
Research Foundation, says that the Eighth Department, or bureau, is
responsible for domestic counterespionage. This includes monitoring
foreigners or Chinese nationals who work for foreign-owned firms in
China or have contacts with the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. The
bureau’s agents in the field mainly carry out surveillance, often
using basic methods such as trailing people, He noted, however,
that every bureau within the ministry has the power to make arrests
(Executive director 22 Aug 2002). At the same time, Jane’s Information Group reports that the
ministry’s Eighth Bureau is a research group tasked mainly with
gathering and analyzing publicly available international affairs
data. The group, known as the Institute of Contemporary
International Relations, collects information on general
international affairs issues, global economic matters, and individual
countries and regions (Jane’s 19 Nov 2002). Jane’s does, however, describe a bureau in the State Security
Ministry that carries out espionage in Hong Kong. The Third Bureau
sends agents to Hong Kong, as well as Macao and Taiwan, to collect
intelligence and tries to recruit Chinese with connections to these
places (Jane’s 19 Nov 2002). The Third Bureau also coordinates a “work group” tasked with
gathering intelligence in Hong Kong and Macao. Code-named Winter
Chrysanthemum, the work group gathers information on the activities
of Taiwanese groups and their representatives in Hong Kong and Macao
and Taiwanese political and military figures visiting these
territories, according to Jane’s. It also collects intelligence on
the activities of foreign political figures and groups in Hong Kong
and the inner workings of the territory’s political bodies (Jane’s 19
Nov 2002). While some of the Third Bureau’s agents work in professional jobs
as covers for their espionage activities, most agents posted to Hong
Kong work in Communist Party or state-run organs such as the Xinhua
News Agency, Jane’s says. Only a few Hong Kong postings are
permanent, with the ministry rotating most agents every few years
(Jane’s 19 Nov 2002). Jane’s also describes a bureau in the State Security Ministry that
spies on pro-democracy groups, although it appears that the bureau
focuses mainly on Western-based groups run by ethnic Chinese. The
Sixth Bureau also carries out counterintelligence activities against
Western firms investing in China believed to be trying to foster
political and market reforms in the country. The bureau reportedly
has spied on pro-democracy groups in the West suspected of sending
“investors” to China who were actually working on political or human
rights issues (Jane’s 19 Nov 2002). These business-related investigations have been scaled back
because of concerns that they could deter foreign investment. The
Sixth Bureau continues to spy on pro-democracy groups, however, and
also carries out training programs that encourage local officials to
report suspicious people and activities, Jane’s reports (Jane’s 19
Nov 2002). The Resource Information Center was unable to find information
about the typical responsibilities of rank officers in the State
Security Ministry. This response was prepared after researching publicly accessible
information currently available to the RIC within time constraints.
This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to
the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. References: Executive Director. Laogai Research Foundation. Telephone
interview (Washington DC: 22 Aug 2002). Jane’s Information Group. JANE’S SENTINEL SECURITY ASSESSMENT:
CHINA AND NORTHEAST ASIA - 12. “Security and Foreign Forces, China”
(updated 19 Nov 2002)
www6.janes.com/pmp/indirect.pmp?match=China&doc=http://www4.janes.com/s
earch97/vs.vts%3Faction%3DView%26VdkVgwKey%3D/content1/janesdata/sent/c
nasu/chins140.htm%26Collection%3Dcurrent%26ViewTemplate%3Djanes_doc_vie
w.hts%26Prod_Name%3DCNAS%26&popup=yes&target=HelpWindow [accessed 1
Apr 2003] Attachments: Jane’s Information Group. JANE’S SENTINEL SECURITY ASSESSMENT:
CHINA AND NORTHEAST ASIA - 12. “Security and Foreign Forces, China”
(updated 19 Nov 2002)
www6.janes.com/pmp/indirect.pmp?match=China&doc=http://www4.janes.com/s
earch97/vs.vts%3Faction%3DView%26VdkVgwKey%3D/content1/janesdata/sent/c
nasu/chins140.htm%26Collection%3Dcurrent%26ViewTemplate%3Djanes_doc_vie
w.hts%26Prod_Name%3DCNAS%26&popup=yes&target=HelpWindow [accessed 1
Apr 2003] |
