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9th Circuit: CA Solicitation To Commit Rape By Force And Solicitation To Commit Assault By Means Of Force Likely To Produce Great Bodily Injury Are Crimes Of Violence Aggravated Feloniesby César Cuauhtémoc García
In a decision released last week, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the California offenses of solicitation to commit rape by force, Cal. Penal Code § 653f(c), and solicitation to commit assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, Cal. Penal Code § 653f(a), are crimes of violence aggravated felonies. Prakash v. Holder, No. 07-72831, slip op. (Aug. 26, 2009) (Silverman, Clifton, and Smith). Judge Clifton wrote for the Court.
“(a) Every person who, with the intent that the crime be committed, solicits another . . . to commit or join in the commission of . . . assault . . . by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury . . . shall be punished by imprisonment . . . . (c) Every person who, with the intent that the crime be committed, solicits another to commit rape by force or violence . . . shall be punished by imprisonment . . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 653f.The Court also noted that solicitation in California “is complete once the verbal request is made with the requisite criminal intent. . . . . Thus, solicitation does not require the defendant to undertake any direct, unequivocal act towards committing the target crime; it is completed by the solicitation itself, whether or not the object of the solicitation is ever achieved, any steps are even taken towards accomplishing it, or the person solicited immediately rejects it.” Prakash, No. No. 07-72831, slip op. at 11793 (quoting People v. Wilson, 114 P.3d 758, 771 (Cal. 2005)).The Ninth Circuit concluded that neither solicitation to commit rape by force, Cal. Penal Code § 653f(c), nor solicitation to commit assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, Cal. Penal Code § 653f(a), have as an element use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force as required by 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). Accordingly, the Court held that these offenses do not constitute a crime of violence under § 16(a). Prakash, No. No. 07-72831, slip op. at 11793. The Court then turned to the definition of COV provided in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Prakash apparently conceded that his offenses entailed “a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used.” Prakash, No. No. 07-72831, slip op. 11793. Rather, he contended only that the offenses did not entail that force to be used “in the course of committing the offense” of solicitation. Prakash, No. No. 07-72831, slip op. at 11793. In effect, he argued that the offense of solicitation does not require the use of any force whatsoever, thus physical force was not used in the commission of the solicitation offense. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Relying on the Third Circuit's decision in Ng v. Attorney General, 436 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2006), held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) “turns on the risk of physical force as a consequence of the criminal conduct at issue, not on the timing of the force.” Prakash, No. No. 07-72831, slip op. at 11794. According to the Ninth Circuit, “It is the risk of violence flowing from a given crime that this statute is concerned with, not necessarily when in a chronological sequence the violence occurs.” Prakash, No. No. 07-72831, slip op. at 11794-95. As such, the Court concluded that these California statutes are COVs because rape and assault inherently present a substantial risk of violence. Prakash, No. No. 07-72831, slip op. at 11794. This will be a tough case to get around.
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