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SUBSCRIBE The leading Copyright |
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice Before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims October 11, 2001 Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, and Members of the
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims: I. Introduction I appreciate
the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims to
discuss the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS’s) use of information
technology to secure America’s borders.
My testimony this morning will focus on the work of the Department of
Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in examining
programs and related automated systems in the INS. In
recent years, the OIG has spent approximately one-half of our total resources
on INS-related oversight. We expended
this effort in response to concerns expressed within the Department and
Congress, as well as our own assessment, about how the INS was handling its
important and diverse responsibilities.
As the INS’s budget and workforce have increased to more than $5 billion
and 33,000 staff, the need for concerted OIG oversight similarly has increased. At
the outset of my statement, I want to stress that while the OIG has noted
serious deficiencies in INS operations and systems over the years, this should
in no way diminish the important contributions thousands of INS employees make
on a daily basis. These employees
perform diligently, under very difficult circumstances, and their mission is
critical to the proper functioning of our government. Yet,
as this statement will discuss, our reviews of INS programs and their
associated information technology systems have revealed significant problems
that leave gaps in the INS’s attempts to secure the nation’s borders. In this statement, I will highlight examples
of OIG work in the INS that identifies some of these shortcomings. Before
I turn to these specific OIG reviews, however, let me offer several general
observations based upon our body of work in the INS. Over the past decade, the OIG has found serious process and
management deficiencies in the INS.
Many OIG reviews of INS programs have questioned the reliability of the
agency’s automated information systems and the accuracy of the data produced by
those systems. We see separate
automated systems planned for almost every function in the INS, but many of
these systems do not “talk” to each other and therefore cannot be used to meet
other important agency missions.
Furthermore, given the INS’s track record in acquiring and managing
information technology (IT) systems, the OIG is concerned that the INS will not
have the managerial expertise or ability to bring all of its automation
initiatives successfully to completion, particularly in a timely and cost
effective fashion. According to Department of Justice
estimates, the INS has spent more than $290 million on automated systems in
fiscal year (FY) 2001 and more than $260 million in FY 2000. All told, through fiscal year 2001, the INS
planned to spend approximately $2.6 billion on its automation programs. However, two OIG reviews of the INS’s
management of its automation initiatives found lengthy delays in completing
many automation programs, unnecessary cost increases, and a significant risk
that finished projects would fail to meet the agency’s needs. The OIG first notified the INS in
1995 of our concerns regarding systemic problems in INS automation
programs. Based on our extensive audit
work during the early 1990s, we identified ten risk areas in the INS’s
management of its automation programs that required close scrutiny by agency
managers. In March 1998, the OIG completed the first of two
comprehensive audits of the INS’s management of its automation programs. In our first audit, we found that the INS did
not adequately monitor its automation programs. We concluded that the INS lacked comprehensive performance
measures and insufficiently tracked the status of its projects. Consequently, the INS could not determine if
progress towards the completion of the projects was acceptable. As a result, we stated that the INS faced
risks that: (1) completed projects
would not meet the overall goals of the automation programs; (2) completion
of the automated projects would be significantly delayed; and (3) unnecessary
cost increases would occur. In July 1999, the OIG issued a
follow-up report, which again found that the INS was not adequately managing
its automation programs. In the 1999
audit, we noted that the INS still could not sufficiently track the status of
its automation projects to determine whether progress was acceptable given the
amount of time and funds already spent.
We reported that: (1) estimated
completion dates for projects were delayed without explanation; (2) costs
continued to spiral upward with no justification for how funds were spent; and
(3) projects neared completion with no assurance for meeting performance and
functional requirements. We identified three causes for
these problems. First, INS managers did
not have a common base line of automation projects by which to focus their
collective efforts. In fact, the INS
had substantial difficulty providing us with a complete list of their
automation projects. Second, project
information needed for effective management and decision-making was not readily
available. Third, INS managers did not
develop, document, or implement basic management control processes necessary to
ensure that projects would be completed on schedule and meet performance and
functional requirements. The ultimate cost
for the INS’s automation programs was uncertain because actual costs incurred
were unreliable and projected cost estimates were unsupported. Furthermore, we found that the INS
had not implemented adequate safeguards to ensure the accuracy of existing data
that would be used by systems being developed or re-engineered, or the adequacy
of future data inputs. As a result, new
or existing INS systems could contain inaccurate or unreliable data. Since these audits, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) issued reports in August 2000 and December 2000 that reached related
conclusions about the INS’s management of its information technology
programs. Those reports concluded that
the INS does not have an enterprise architecture to ensure that the hundreds of
millions of dollars it spends each year on new and existing technology will
optimally support the INS’s mission.
The GAO also concluded that the INS did not have adequate processes in
place to effectively manage its planned and ongoing information technology
programs. I will now describe several OIG
reviews that examined the management and performance of individual INS
information technology systems. A. Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT) In 1989, the INS began to develop an
automated biometric identification system to identify quickly individuals who
are apprehended or have come into contact with the INS. Biometrics are biological measurements
unique to each person, such as fingerprints, hand geometry, facial patterns, retinal
patterns, or other characteristics, that are used to identify individuals. Fingerprints are the most common biometric
used by law enforcement agencies.
Historically, without a biometric system, the INS had to rely upon the
names provided by aliens who were apprehended when checking against their
databases or other records. But aliens
often used false names or different names during different apprehensions. Also, many persons have similar names, and
spelling errors can result in problems identifying individuals accurately. After several studies, in 1994 the INS began implementing the
Automatic Biometric Identification System, called IDENT. IDENT was first deployed in the San Diego
Border Patrol Sector and subsequently throughout the southwest border. IDENT workstations consist of a personal
computer, camera, and a single-fingerprint scanner. During enrollment of individuals into IDENT, INS agents scan an
individual’s two fingerprints, take the individual’s photograph, and enter
basic apprehension information about the individual into the automated
system. When this information is saved,
IDENT matches the fingerprints of the individual against the corresponding
fingerprints of all individuals in two central IDENT databases, the lookout
database and the recidivist database. In the 1996 Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Congress directed the INS to expand
the use of IDENT to “apply to illegal or criminal aliens apprehended
Nationwide.” INS officials envisioned
that most of the agency’s programs and operations – including the Border
Patrol, Investigations, Detention and Deportation, Intelligence, Inspections,
Benefits Adjudication, and the INS Service Centers – would benefit from the
IDENT system through its quick identification of individuals and its ability to
obtain information about them from previous encounters with the INS, including
any criminal history. In 1998, the
OIG evaluated the INS’s implementation of IDENT and found that the INS was
enrolling less than two-thirds of the aliens apprehended along the U.S.-Mexico
border into the IDENT system. In
addition, the INS was entering the fingerprints in the IDENT lookout database
of only 41 percent of the aliens deported and excluded in FY 1996; of
these, only 24 percent had accompanying photographs even though the INS
relies on photographs to confirm identification. We found virtually no controls in place to ensure the quality of
data entered into the IDENT lookout database.
As a result, we found duplicate records and invalid data. We also raised concerns that the INS had not
provided sufficient training to its employees on the use of IDENT. These failures hampered the INS’s ability to
make consistent and effective use of IDENT. B. The
Rafael Resendez-Ramirez Case and the Operation of IDENT In March
2000, the OIG issued another review
that implicated the IDENT system in tragic circumstances. The OIG examined how the INS handled its
encounters with Rafael Resendez-Ramirez (Resendez), a Mexican national accused of
committing several murders in the United States. Resendez was known as “the railway killer” because he allegedly
traveled around the United States by freight train and committed murders near
railroad lines. In early 1999, Texas
police obtained a warrant for Resendez’s arrest in connection with a brutal
murder in Houston, Texas. The police
mounted an extensive search to find Resendez and contacted several INS
investigators in Houston seeking assistance in the search for him. However, none of those INS investigators
placed a lookout notice` for Resendez in IDENT. Instead, the INS investigators referred the police to other
agencies or databases. Consequently, when Border Patrol
agents apprehended Resendez on June 1, 1999, as he attempted to illegally cross
the border into New Mexico, nothing in IDENT alerted them to the fact that
Resendez was wanted for murder or had an extensive criminal record. As a result, the Border Patrol followed its
standard policy and voluntarily returned Resendez to Mexico. He returned to the United States within days
of his release and murdered several more people before surrendering on July 13,
1999. The OIG review concluded that the
failings by the INS employees who did not place a lookout for Resendez in IDENT
were indicative of and partly caused by larger failings in the INS’s design and
implementation of IDENT. We found that
the training that was given to INS employees on IDENT, particularly outside the
Border Patrol, was ineffective or non-existent. In the 1998 OIG report, we had noted problems with IDENT training
and recommended that the INS develop and implement a strategy for sufficiently
training INS personnel using IDENT.
Unfortunately, the INS largely rejected this recommendation, claiming
that its IDENT training was adequate.
We found in the Resendez review that INS program offices, such as
Investigations and Intelligence, viewed IDENT as a Border Patrol initiative and
were not educated on how IDENT could be useful to their mission. When we interviewed INS employees
in various offices involved with the Resendez case, we found that their
knowledge of IDENT was severely lacking.
The INS investigators who were contacted by police searching for
Resendez did not think of IDENT, even when they were asked to place a lookout
in INS databases for Resendez. Although
the INS had distributed a lookout policy, it provided no training on the policy
and did little to ensure that the policy was understood or read. IDENT was not, and still is not,
linked with FBI databases. The INS’s IDENT system and the FBI’s Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) and the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) 2000 system were developed separately and along
different time lines. Although the INS
and the FBI periodically discussed integration of their systems as they were
being developed, there was never a sustained effort to achieve that goal and no
agreement on integration was reached.
We were told that the INS and the FBI made little effort to understand
the operational requirements of the other agency. Each agency focused on meeting its own requirements and did not
pursue integration. As a result, when
the FBI finally deployed IAFIS and NCIC 2000 in July 1999, the FBI fingerprint
systems were not linked to IDENT. The Resendez case vividly
illustrated the need for integration of the INS and FBI systems and spurred the
FBI and the INS to develop an integration plan. The plan required studies to help determine the feasibility of
integration of the systems, which initially would allow the fingerprints of
aliens apprehended by the INS to be searched against a subset of the FBI’s
Criminal Master File and eventually against the entire master file. However, an integration plan is still in the
process of being developed and may take years to implement fully. C. Nonimmigrant Overstays The INS estimates the number of
illegal aliens in the United States at 5 million to 6 million, while
others estimate the number to be even higher.
A common perception about illegal aliens is that the vast majority enter
the United States by surreptitiously crossing our land borders, primarily from
Mexico. In fact, the INS estimates that
approximately 40 to 50 percent of the illegal alien population entered the
United States legally as temporary visitors but simply failed to depart when
required. The INS refers to these
illegal aliens as nonimmigrant “overstays.”
More than 90 percent of overstays are tourists or business visitors, but
overstays also include students and temporary workers. In a 1997 inspection, the OIG found that the
principal INS record-keeping system for tracking nonimmigrant overstays, the
Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS), does not produce reliable data, either
in the aggregate or on individual nonimmigrants. Normally, passengers arriving in the United States fill out an
I-94 form and present it to the INS inspector upon arrival. The inspector collects the arrival portion
of the form and returns the departure portion to the passenger. The arrival portion is sent to an INS
contractor, who inputs the data into NIIS.
When the person leaves the United States, the airlines are supposed to
collect the departure portion of the I-94 form and provide it to the INS for
input into NIIS. The data is then
matched by NIIS to identify nonimmigrant overstays. We found that the NIIS data is
incomplete and unreliable due to missing departure records and errors in
processing of the records. NIIS does
not contain departure records for a large number of aliens, most of whom the
INS assumes have left the United States.
The INS believes that unrecorded departures result from airlines failing
to collect departure forms, from aliens departing through land borders, from
data entry errors, from records being lost through electronic transmission or
tape-loading problems, or from the failure of the system to match arrival and
departure records. We also found that the INS had no
specific enforcement program to identify, locate, apprehend, and remove
nonimmigrant overstays, and we concluded that NIIS data would be of little use
for locating aliens. D. The INS’s
Automated I-94 System The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 directed the
Attorney General to develop an automated entry and exit control system that
would collect a record for every alien departing the United States and
automatically match these departure records with the record of the alien’s
arrival. This proposal was designed to
replace the manual system of collecting I-94 cards and enable the INS, through
on-line searching procedures, to identify lawfully admitted nonimmigrants who
remain in the United Sates beyond the period authorized. In 2000, however, Congress extended the
deadline for implementing the system for airports and sea border ports of entry
until December 31, 2003, and for high-traffic land border ports of entry until
December 31, 2004. In response to this
congressional requirement, the INS introduced a pilot system in 1997 to
automate the processing of air passenger I-94 forms. This automated I-94 system captures arrival and departure data
electronically and uploads non-U.S. citizen data to the INS’s NIIS. This summer, the
OIG completed an audit of the design and implementation of the automated I-94
system and found that the INS has not properly managed the project. Despite having spent $31.2 million on the
system from FY 1996 to FY 2000, the INS:
(1) does not have clear evidence that the system meets its intended
goals; (2) has won the cooperation of only two airlines; (3) is operating the
system at only a few airports; and (4) is in the process of modifying the
system. INS officials estimated that an
additional $57 million would be needed for FY 2001 through FY 2005 to
complete the system. These projections
include development, equipment, and operation and maintenance costs. As a result of our concerns, we
made a series of recommendations to help ensure that the INS rigorously
analyzes the costs, benefits, risks, and performance measures of the automated
I-94 System before proceeding with further expenditures. The
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 created the Visa Waiver Pilot
Program (VWPP), which permitted citizens from certain countries to enter the
United States as visitors without first obtaining a visa. The law allowed VWPP visitors to stay in the
United States for up to 90 days per visit and required them to possess a round
trip ticket and waive their rights to appeal immigration officers’
determinations of admissibility or contest any deportation actions. In October 2000, the program became
permanent and is now known as the Visa Waiver Program. Currently visa requirements are waived for
citizens of 29 countries who wish to visit the United States. In 1999, the OIG assessed the INS’s
efforts to minimize illegal immigration and security threats posed by abuse of
the VWPP. Because visitors traveling
for business or pleasure under the VWPP were not required to obtain visas, they
were not screened in any way prior to their arrival at U.S. ports of
entry. Instead, VWPP visitors presented
their passports to INS inspectors on arrival.
The inspectors observed the applicants, examined their passports, and
conducted checks against a computerized lookout system to decide whether to
allow applicants entry into the United States.
This review by INS inspectors was the principal means of preventing
illegal entry. INS inspectors had, on average,
less than one minute to check and decide on each applicant. As a result of our review, we found
that INS inspectors did not query all VWPP passport numbers against the INS’s
computerized system. In addition, our
inspection noted that terrorists,
criminals, and alien smugglers have attempted to gain entry into the United States
through the VWPP. During our review, the INS informed
the OIG that the theft of passports from VWPP countries was a serious
problem. Because these stolen passports
are genuine documents, their fraudulent use is difficult for INS inspectors to
detect. During our review, we tested a
sample of 1,067 passports stolen from VWPP countries and found that almost 10
percent may have been used to successfully enter the United States. We also identified problems with the way the
INS maintains its lookout system, including its failure to enter information
about stolen VWPP passports into the lookout database in a timely or accurate
manner. As a result, 567 stolen
passports in our sample of 1,067 (53 percent) had no lookout record in the INS
system. Of the 500 passport numbers
that had lookout records, 112 (22 percent) were not entered accurately. This missing or inaccurate information
reduced the effectiveness of the lookout system and increased the possibility
that inadmissible VWPP applicants could enter the United States. F. The OIG’s “Bombs in
Brooklyn” Report In a report issued in March 1998,
the OIG examined how two individuals, Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer and Lafi Khalil,
entered and remained in the United States before their July 1997 apprehension
in Brooklyn for allegedly planning to bomb the New York City subway
system. Mezer was subsequently
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Khalil was acquitted of charges stemming from the bombing plot but found
guilty of immigration violations. In our report, we described how
both men were able to enter the United States and remain here. Khalil, who had a Jordanian passport,
applied to the U.S. Consular Office in Jerusalem for a visa to travel through
the United States en route to Ecuador.
The consular official gave him a 29-day, C-1 transit visa after a
three-minute interview. When Khalil
arrived in New York on December 7, 1996, an immigration inspector mistakenly
granted him a 6‑month, B-2 tourist visa.
He overstayed that visa and was arrested in Brooklyn, along with Mezer,
in July 1997. Mezer, who claimed Jordanian
nationality, received a visa from the Canadian Embassy in Israel to study in
Canada. Shortly after arriving in
Canada in September 1993, he applied for convention status, which is similar to
political asylum in the United States, based on his claimed fear of persecution
in Israel. Mezer later admitted that he
had traveled to Canada with the intent to reach the United States. In 1996, Mezer was detained by the
Border Patrol twice while attempting to cross the border into Washington
State. Each time the Border Patrol
voluntarily returned him to Canada. In
January 1997, the Border Patrol apprehended Mezer in Washington a third time
and initiated formal deportation proceedings.
Mezer then filed an application for political asylum in the United
States and was later released on a $5,000 bond. In his asylum application, Mezer claimed that Israeli authorities
had persecuted him because they wrongly believed he was a member of Hamas. The immigration court requested comments from
the State Department about Mezer’s asylum application, and the State Department
returned the application with a sticker indicating that it did not have
specific information on Mezer. Mezer’s
attorney later withdrew the asylum application, stating that Mezer had returned
to Canada. Mezer was arrested shortly
thereafter in Brooklyn for plotting to bomb the subway system. During our review, we did not find
any information that Mezer was a known terrorist. However, we found systemic problems that were revealed by his
case. Our review found that Mezer had
entered and remained in Canada despite two criminal convictions there, which
highlighted the ease of entry into Canada and the difficulty of controlling
illegal immigration from Canada into the United States. We also noted the inadequacy of Border
Patrol resources to address illegal immigration along the northern border. In addition, Mezer’s case reflected
confusion between U.S. government agencies as to which agency would conduct a
check for information on whether an asylum applicant was a terrorist. We recommended that the INS and the State
Department coordinate more closely on accessing and sharing information that would
suggest a detained alien or asylum applicant may be a terrorist. In February 2000, the OIG issued a
report that systematically examined the Border Patrol’s efforts to control
illegal activity along the northern border, examined how the Border Patrol
collects and assesses information about illegal activity and responds to it,
and evaluated the allocation of Border Patrol resources to the northern border. The nearly 4,000 miles of border
between the United States and Canada are managed by 8 of the Border Patrol’s 21
sectors. As of September 30, 1999, 311
of the national total of 8,364 Border Patrol agents (3.7 percent) were assigned
to northern border sectors. In keeping
with the INS’s strategic plan, the Border Patrol deployed 7,706 Border Patrol
agents (92.1 percent of the total) to its nine southwest Border Patrol
sectors. The remaining 347 agents were
assigned to the coastal sectors, headquarters, INS regional offices, and the
Border Patrol Academy. Currently, according to the INS, there are 334 Border
Patrol agents assigned to the northern border. Border Patrol sectors on the
Canadian border face significant challenges, even though the volume of known
illegal alien entries is much less than along the Mexican border. The OIG review reported an increase in
illegal activity along the northern border, including an increase in alien and
drug smuggling. But the INS was unable
to assess the level of illegal activity along the northern border, given the
limited personnel and equipment resources allotted to its eight northern Border
Patrol sectors. However, it is clear
that the level of illegal activity exceeds the Border Patrol’s capacity to
respond. We also found that other
factors, such as the detailing of agents from the northern to the southwest
border and lack of detention space to house apprehended aliens, further diluted
the Border Patrol’s enforcement capabilities along the northern border. We concluded that the number of
agents assigned could not adequately patrol the entire length of the northern
border. Shifts with no Border Patrol
coverage left the northern border open.
INS Intelligence officers also told us that criminals monitor the Border
Patrol’s radio communications and observe their actions. The criminals know the times when the fewest
agents are on duty and plan their illegal operations accordingly. The Border Patrol realized this risk but,
because of the low numbers of agents assigned to northern border sectors, it
could not cover all shifts 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Most Border Patrol officials we interviewed
believed around-the-clock coverage was the minimum acceptable level of coverage
for northern Border Patrol stations. “Force-multipliers” such as
cameras, sensors, and other technology aid the Border Patrol in its
surveillance and interdiction activities, but we found that northern border
sectors do not have adequate amounts of this equipment. For example, at the time of our inspection,
one northern border sector had identified 65 smuggling corridors along the more
than 300 miles of border within its area of responsibility, but the sector had
only 36 sensors with which to monitor these corridors. The Border Patrol’s Strategic Plan,
issued in 1994, does not address the northern border until the plan’s fourth
and final phase. Phase I of the
Strategic Plan was designed to control the San Diego and El Paso Corridors;
Phase II to control South Texas and Tucson corridors; Phase III to control the
remainder of the southwest border; and Phase IV to control the rest of the
borders, including the northern border.
At the time of our inspection in 2000, the Border Patrol was in Phase II
of its strategic plan, and no date had been set for implementation of Phase IV. In addition, the strategic plan did not
articulate the strategies that the Border Patrol would eventually use to
control the northern border once it has achieved control of the southwest
border. The OIG recommended
that the INS Commissioner outline the approach the Border Patrol would take to
secure the northern border, including determining the minimum number of Border
Patrol agents required to address existing gaps in coverage, determining the
amount of intelligence resources needed to more accurately assess the level of
illegal activity, and identifying and implementing accurate data collection
methods to support decisions about personnel and equipment. INS eventually wrote a strategic plan
regarding the northern border, but we understand that it has not been implemented. We also recommended that the Commissioner
evaluate whether there was a continuing need to detail Border Patrol agents out
of northern sectors. In
addition, we concluded that the INS’s Interior Voluntary Return Tracking System
(IVRTS), implemented in FY 1997, did not track individual aliens who were
granted voluntary departure and thus could offer only an incomplete count of
the number of these departures nationwide.
At the time of our review, IVRTS did not record the names or alien
numbers of the aliens granted voluntary departure. Furthermore, the system provided no information suitable for
follow-up enforcement and no useful information to include in the INS’s lookout
indices. A March 2001 OIG audit tested INS
data in TECS related to secondary inspections (inspections of travelers that
require a more detailed review than the standard primary inspection) at three
airports. The audit examined whether
the data accurately reflected referrals of travelers to secondary inspection
and whether the data included secondary inspection results. We found that the INS’s data in TECS for
inspections performed at two airports were reliable, while the data for
inspections at the third was not. We
found that the third airport’s inspectors entered the required referral
designation and secondary inspection results in TECS for only 3 percent of
the secondary inspections performed. III. Conclusion As described
by these reports, our work has found that the INS has not managed its diverse
information technology systems well. We
found numerous and longstanding problems of failures by INS managers to
implement reliable, integrated systems in a timely and cost-effective
manner. We believe that the INS needs to
more stringently establish priorities on the development of its systems, rather
than spend enormous resources and effort to develop so many systems for so many
different purposes. The INS has in use
or in development approximately 100 automated information systems and it
appears to have a separate system for each function in the agency, without
sufficient connection or interrelation.
Among other recommendations, based
on our work we urge the INS to ensure that its databases share information,
both within and outside the INS. For
example, the INS and the FBI’s automated fingerprint systems – IDENT, IAFIS,
and NCIC 2000 – need to be connected.
The INS also needs to expand the use of biometrics to accurately
identify individuals with whom the INS comes into contact. It is clear that more resources
need to be devoted to the northern border.
Technology such as cameras and sensors can help in this effort, but
there are too few agents and inspectors along the northern border. The INS also must improve its
tracking of nonimmigrant visa overstays.
The current system for identifying overstays – manual I-94 cards
inputted into the NIIS database – does not produce reliable or accurate
information, either as a whole or on individual overstays, and the automated
I-94 project has not worked. The INS
must design a system that can accurately capture arrival and departure data,
and automatically match them in a reliable fashion.
Solving the
problems of INS information technology is a complex issue with no easy
solutions, but it requires a strategic vision, strong leadership, and
individual and organizational accountability.
This effort needs to be a top priority of the agency, since effective
INS information technology is essential to protecting the integrity of the
immigration system and the national security. This concludes my prepared
statement. I would be pleased to answer
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