The 109th Congress passed provisions to facilitate the completion of a three-tiered, 14-mile fence, along the border near San Diego in the REAL ID Act of 2005 (H.R. 418), which was subsequently added to H.R. 1268, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, and signed into law on May 11, 2005 (P.L. 109-13). The new provisions allow the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to waive all legal requirements determined necessary to ensure expeditious construction of authorized barriers and roads. In September of 2005, the Secretary announced that he was using this authority to waive a number of mostly environmental and conservation laws. Other bills in the 109th Congress, including House-passed H.R. 4437 and H.R. 6061 and Senate-passed S. 2611, would call on the Secretary to construct reinforced fencing and vehicle barriers along vast portions of the southwest border. This report outlines the issues involved with DHS’s completion of the San Diego border fence and highlights some of the major legislative and administrative developments regarding the construction of new border fences. This report will be updated as warranted.

Background

The United States Border Patrol (USBP) is the lead federal agency charged with securing the U.S. international land border with Mexico and Canada. In the early 1990s, the USBP incorporated the construction of physical barriers directly on the border into their National Strategic Plan as part of the “Prevention Through Deterrence” strategy, which called for reducing unauthorized migration by placing agents and resources directly on the border abutting population centers. The USBP first constructed border fencing in the San Diego sector, which extends inland from the Pacific Ocean along the international land border with Mexico, and covers approximately 7,000 square miles of territory. Located north of Tijuana and Tecate, Mexican cities with a combined population of 2
According to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the primary fence, in combination with various labor intensive USBP enforcement initiatives along San Diego border region (i.e., Operation Gatekeeper), proved to be quite successful but fiscally and environmentally costly. For example, as undocumented aliens and smugglers breached the primary fence and attempted to evade detection, USBP agents were often forced to pursue the suspects through environmentally sensitive areas. It soon became apparent to immigration officials and lawmakers that the USBP needed, among other things, a “rigid” enforcement system that could integrate infrastructure (i.e., a multi-tiered fence and roads), manpower, and new technologies to further control the border region.

The concept of a three-tiered fence system was first recommended by a 1993 Sandia Laboratories study commissioned by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The study concluded that aliens attempting to enter the United States from Mexico had shown remarkable resourcefulness in bypassing or destroying obstacles in their path, including the existing primary fence, and postulated that “[a] three-fence barrier system with vehicle patrol roads between the fences and lights will provide the necessary discouragement.” Congress responded to these enforcement needs, in part, with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. This comprehensive law, among other things, expanded the existing fence by authorizing the INS to construct a triple-layered fence along the same 14 miles of the US-Mexico border near San Diego. Since 1990, Congress has also included language in DOD appropriations bills allowing the DOD to assist federal agencies in counter-drug activities,
including the construction of fencing and roads to reduce the flow of narcotics into the country.\(^7\) In 2001, this power was re-authorized through FY2006.\(^8\)

### Section 102 of IIRIRA — Improvement of Barriers at the Border

Section 102 of IIRIRA concerns the improvement and construction of barriers at our international borders. Section 102(a) appears to give the AG\(^9\) broad authority to install additional physical barriers and roads “in the vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United States.” The phrase *vicinity of the United States border* is not defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §§1101 *et seq.* or in immigration regulations. The section also does not stipulate what specific characteristics would designate an area as one of *high illegal entry*.

Section 102(b) mandates that the AG construct a barrier in the border area near San Diego. Specifically, §102(b) directs the AG to construct a three-tiered barrier along the 14 miles of the international land border of the United States, starting at the Pacific Ocean and extending eastward. Section 102(b) ensures that the AG will build a barrier, pursuant to his broader authority in §102(a), near the San Diego area, although there is some debate whether IIRIRA requires *continuous* triple fencing and roads for the entire 14-mile corridor.\(^10\) Section 102(b) also provides authority for the acquisition of necessary easements, requires that certain safety features be incorporated into the design of the fence, and authorizes an appropriation not to exceed $12 million.

Section 102(c) — before its amendment in the REAL ID Act as part of P.L. 109-13 — waived the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 (16 U.S.C. §§1531 *et seq.* and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §§4321 *et seq.*), to the extent the AG determined necessary, in order to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers authorized to be constructed under §102.\(^11\) The waiver authority in this provision appears to apply both to barriers that may be constructed *in the vicinity of the border* under §102(a) and to the barrier that is to be constructed near the San Diego area under §102(b). The REAL ID Act amended §102(c) to, among other things, authorize the waiver of *all* legal requirements determined necessary for the construction of the barriers and roads authorized to be constructed in §102 of IIRIRA.

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\(^{9}\) Although the law still cites to the Attorney General, the authorities granted by this section now appear to rest with the Secretary of DHS. See The Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 104-208, §§102(a), 441, 1512(d) and 1517 (references to the Attorney General or Commissioner in statute and regulations are deemed to refer to the Secretary).

\(^{10}\) See CCC, *Staff Report*, at 7 nt. 2 and p. 23 nt. 4.

\(^{11}\) CBP apparently never used this waiver authority and even published a Final Environmental Impact Study pursuant to NEPA and received a non-jeopardy Biological Opinion from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service under the ESA. CCC, *Staff Report*, at 14.
San Diego Sector Apprehensions

Apprehension statistics have long been used as a performance measure by the USBP. However, the number of apprehensions may be a misleading statistic for several reasons, including the data’s focus on events rather than people and the absence of reliable estimates for how many aliens successfully evade capture. These factors aside, however, apprehension data remain the best way to gain a glimpse into the reality facing USBP agents and the trends in unauthorized migration along the border. As Figure 1 shows, apprehensions remained stable during the early 1990s in the San Diego sector despite the construction of the “primary” fence in 1993.

After the IIRIRA’s mandate for increased enforcement along the Southwest border in 1996, including construction of the triple-fence, apprehensions dropped rapidly in the San Diego sector in the late 1990s — from 480,000 in FY1996 to 100,000 in FY2002. Although some of this reduction may have been due to the construction of the triple-fence, the number of agents assigned to the San Diego sector also increased significantly over this period — from 980 agents in 1993 to 2,274 in 1998. Additionally, the number of underground sensors deployed in the San Diego sector almost tripled from 1993 to 1998, and the fleet of vehicles increased by over 150% over the same period.

The increase in manpower and resources reflected the USBP’s policy of re-routing unauthorized migration away from population centers to remote border regions where their agents have a tactical advantage over border-crossers. Other sectors, especially the remote Tucson sector in Arizona, saw apprehensions increase significantly in the late 1990s. Proponents of border fences point to the drastic reduction in apprehensions along the San Diego sector as tangible proof that these fences succeed in their goal of reducing cross-border smuggling and migration where they are constructed. Opponents attribute part of the decrease in apprehensions to the increase in manpower and resources in the sector and (pointing to the increase in apprehensions in less-populated sectors) contend that the fence only succeeds in re-routing unauthorized migration. Additionally, some

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12 If the same person is apprehended multiple times attempting to enter the country in one year, each apprehension will be counted separately by the USBP in generating their apprehension statistics. This means that apprehension statistics may overstate the number of aliens apprehended each year.

13 CBP data provided to CRS on Jan. 12, 2004.

believe the reduction in apprehensions can be attributed to the economic recession in the United States which depressed the job market, while others note that the reduction began in the late 1990s when the economy was still undergoing a period of robust growth.

Recent Developments

The Controversy. Of the 14 miles authorized to be constructed, nine miles of the triple-fence have been completed. Two sections, including the final three-mile stretch of fence that leads to the Pacific Ocean, have not been finished. In order to finish the fence, the USBP proposed to fill a deep canyon known as “Smuggler’s Gulch” with over 2 million cubic yards of dirt. The triple-fence would then be extended across the filled gulch. California’s Coastal Commission (CCC), however, objected to and essentially halted the completion of the fence in February 2004, because it determined that the CBP had not demonstrated, among other things, that the project was consistent “to the maximum extent practicable” with the policies of the California Coastal Management Program — a state program approved under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) (16 U.S.C. §§1451-1464).15

The CZMA requires federal agency activity within or outside the coastal zone that affects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone to be carried out in a manner that is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the policies of an approved state management program.16 Specifically, the CCC was concerned with the potential for significant adverse effects on (1) the Tijuana River National Estuarine Research and Reserve; (2) state and federally listed threatened and endangered species; (3) lands set aside for protection within California’s Multiple Species Conservation Program; and (4) other aspects of the environment. The CCC held that Congress did not specify a particular design in the IIRIRA and that the CBP failed to present a convincing argument that the less environmentally damaging alternative projects it rejected would have prevented compliance with the IIRIRA.

Congressional Action. Although the IIRIRA allowed DHS to waive two major environmental laws, it did not include the CZMA in its purview. Congress, accordingly, attempted to pass legislation to facilitate the completion of the fence. The final version of the House-passed version of the intelligence bill in the 108th Congress, S. 2845, for example, contained language that would have added the CZMA, among a wide array of other environmental, conservation, and cultural restrictions, to the list of laws and regulations that DHS could waive in its construction of border barriers.17 This section was ultimately removed during the conference process, and no border fence type provision was included in the intelligence bill that was signed into law (P.L. 108-458).

In the 109th Congress, H.R. 418, the REAL ID Act of 2005, contained language requiring the Secretary of DHS to waive all laws necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the security barriers. H.R. 418 was passed by the House as a stand-alone piece of legislation, but was also attached as an amendment to House-passed H.R. 1268,

15 See CCC, Staff Report, at 5-7.
16 16 U.S.C. §1456(c).
17 S. 2845 EAH, §3131.
the emergency supplemental appropriations bill for FY2005. During conference, language was revised in H.R. 1268 to “authorize,” instead of “require,” the Secretary of DHS to waive all “legal requirements,” instead of “all laws.” The conferees also added a new provision that would make such waiver decisions effective upon publication in the Federal Register. Language was also added granting federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction to review claims alleging that the actions or decisions of the Secretary violate the U.S. Constitution, and allowing district court rulings to be reviewed only by the U.S. Supreme Court. H.R. 1268 was signed into law on May 11, 2005 (P.L. 109-13).

The waiver authority provided in §102 appears to be a broad grant of authority because, in part, it authorizes the waiver of all legal requirements determined necessary by the Secretary for the expeditious construction of authorized barriers and only allows judicial review for constitutional claims. Furthermore, these claims can only be appealed to the Supreme Court (i.e., there is no intermediate appellate review), whose review is discretionary. Moreover, because §102 of the REAL ID Act amends only the waiver provision of §102 of IIRIRA, the new waiver authority appears to apply to all the barriers that may be constructed under IIRIRA — that is, both to barriers constructed in the vicinity of the border and to the barrier that is to be constructed near the San Diego area.

Other bills in the 109th Congress also contain border fence provisions. For example, the House passed H.R. 4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, which would amend §102(b) of IIRIRA to require the construction of at least two layers of reinforced fencing and the implementation of surveillance measures (lighting, sensors, cameras) along roughly 730 miles of the southwest border. The House also passed the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (H.R. 6061), which would authorize more than 700 miles of two-layered reinforced fencing along selected populated areas of the southwest border. Relatedly, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (S. 2611), as passed by the Senate, would replace and expand the current fencing in the Border Patrol’s Tucson and Yuma Sectors with a reinforced double- or triple-layered fence and would require at least 370 miles of new triple-fencing and 500 miles of vehicle barriers along the southwest border.

Construction. The military has now begun rebuilding the San Diego border fence. On September 22, 2005, DHS published a Federal Register notice declaring the waiver of, in their entirety: (1) the NEPA; (2) the ESA; (3) the CZMA; (4) the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. §§1251 et seq.); (5) the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. §§470 et seq.); (6) the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. §§703 et seq.); (7) the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§7401 et seq.); and (8) the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§551 et seq.).18 Relatedly, plans to construct a 123 mile vehicle barrier, consisting of steel beams planted five feet deep into concrete bases, along the Arizona border are also moving forward.19 The FY2006 DHS Appropriations Act provides, within the CBP construction account, $35 million for the construction of the border fence in San Diego and $35 million for tactical infrastructure in the USBP’s Tucson sector (P.L. 109-90).

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18 The waiver also includes all federal, state, or other laws and regulations deriving from the listed laws.